On the Return to Venture Capital by Boyan Jovanovic & Balàzs Szentes
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank A. Dittmar, I. Guler, J. Ritter, S. Woodward and Y. Yafeh for data and comments, M.A.
Campo-Rembado, W. Fuchs, R. Hall, N. Kyotaki, A. Ljungqvist, C. Michelacci, J. Stein, M. Ueda,
L. White and S. Woodward for comments, the NSF for support and A. Gavazza, V. Tsyrennikov, and
M. Kredler for ably estimating the model and providing comments on the entire paper. We also thank
the NSF and the Kauffman Foundation for support. Appendix B was written by Matthias Kredler.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Boyan Jovanovic and Balàzs Szentes. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.On the Return to Venture Capital
Boyan Jovanovic and Balàzs Szentes
NBER Working Paper No. 12874
January 2007, Revised September 2007
JEL No. G24,L26
ABSTRACT
We provide a model that links the high return to venture equity to the impatience of the VCs. VCs
are scarce, and hence, they have market power and a high return on their investments. As a result,
VCs are eager to terminate non-performing ventures so they can move on to new ones. The scarcity
of VCs enables them to internalize their social value, and the competitive equilibrium is socially optimal.
We estimate the model and back out the return of solo entrepreneurs which is always below that of
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This paper builds and estimates a model that explains several facts:
1. Venture investments yield returns several points above what their risk charac-
teristics would warrant. Cochrane (2005) estimates Alpha at over 30 percent,
Ljungqvist and Richardson ﬁnd it to be at least ﬁve percent, Kaplan and Schoar
(2005) argue that it may well be four or ﬁve percent, and Hall and Woodward
(2007) estimate it at around two percent.4
2. Founders are more attached to and more patient with their projects than VCs
who, according to Sahlman (1990), Wright and Robbie (1998) and Jones and
Rhodes-Kropf (2004), behave as if their discount rates were as high as 30 to 50
percent,
3. VC-backed companies are worth more at IPO (Megginson and Weiss 1991,
Hochberg 2004),
4 .T h es u r v i v a lo fV C - b a c k e dc o m p a n i e si sn o ta n yh i g h e rt h a nt h a to fs o l ov e n -
tures (Manigart, Baeyens, and Van Hyfte 2002, Goldfarb, Kirsch, and Miller
2006)
Our model explains these facts in the following way:
1. VCs and, hence, operating VC funds are scarce compared to the number of
proposals they see; this raises the rents that VC funds get from the projects
that they ﬁnance, and raises the quality of projects that they accept. We do
not explain why VCs are scarce, we only trace the consequences of that scarcity
for the variables of interest.
2. Because the VC can always move on to a new company, looking after a non-
performing company entails for him a foregone-earnings cost that a founder
does not face, and this makes the VC less patient.
3. The impatient VC imposes a higher quality hurdle than the founder does, and
this selection eﬀect raises the IPO values of VC-backed ﬁrms above those of
other ﬁrms.
4. The VC has a deeper pocket than the founder, but he is less patient. The net
eﬀect on terminations is ambiguous.
4If the U.K. betas on venture are in the same ballpark as U.S. betas — say around the 1.7 percent
that Hall and Woodward (2007) estimate — then the U.K. Alpha on Venture is even higher than
the U.S. alpha. Writing in the early 90s (i.e, before the really high market returns of the late 90s
which would, in the usual calculations imply a higher required rate of return) Bygrave (1994) says
that “...VC returns have most often been in the teens, with occasional periods in the 20-30 per cent
range and rare spikes above 30 per cent.
2The main actors in the model are VCs5 who have unlimited wealth, and entre-
preneurs who are endowed with limited wealth and with projects. A project entails
start-up and continuation costs. The start-up cost must be paid before any infor-
mation about the project’s quality can come in. After that, continuation costs must
be paid until the project succeeds or is terminated. Start-up costs entail only capi-
tal, but continuation costs entail capital and eﬀort: funds must be supplied and the
entrepreneur must exert eﬀort without interruption until the project yields fruit.
Project quality has two dimensions: Payoﬀ size, and the waiting time until the
payoﬀ is realized. Neither dimension is known before a contract between a VC and
entrepreneur is signed, after which the payoﬀ is learned, but not the waiting time.
Either party can, at any time, terminate the project. The entrepreneur can do so
by withholding eﬀort, the VC by withholding capital. The optimal contract is set
up so that when a project is terminated, both are better oﬀ: The entrepreneur no
longer wishes to exert eﬀort, and the VC no longer wishes to lend. The VC is in
the model a supplier of capital and is also able to recognize project quality in a way
that banks cannot (in reality a good VC must have a hybrid of skills; he must be
able to evaluate technology, demand, and managerial talent). Thus the VC does not
add value to the project directly. We shall show that our model is consistent with
Sørensen (forthcoming) who ﬁnds that the bulk of the observed positive association
between VC quality and project quality is due not to direct VC inﬂuence on the
payoﬀ,b u tt os o r t i n g .
Because entrepreneurs have some wealth, some will opt to run their projects alone,
“solo”. Bank lending is unproﬁtable because banks lack the expertise of the VCs in
assessing project quality. A solo entrepreneur may run out of money before the
optimal termination date, which forces a poor entrepreneur to use VC funding or
abandon her project.
The outcome is eﬃcient for a wide range of parameter values. Eﬃciency pertains
to both (i) contracting between VCs and entrepreneurs and the resulting termination
rules, and to (ii) entrepreneurs’ choices over whether to seek VC backing, whether to
develop the project on their own, or whether to abandon the project altogether.
We ﬁt a seven-parameter version of the model to panel data on 1355 ﬁrms from the
1980s and ’90s, and display the results in a series of graphs. The model matches reality
along several dimensions, such as the project-success hazard, the project-termination
hazard, equity shares, and up-front investment costs. The ﬁti sr e m a r k a b l eg i v e nt h e
number of parameters is less than the number of variables ﬁtted. The model empha-
sizes the behavior of real variables: Project duration, project value and age-related
rate of return, rate of termination, and the equity share of the VC and entrepreneur.
We only predict the equity shares, and not the ﬁner features of contracts such as
the use of convertible debt. In this stylized setting, the focus is on whether we see
5We do not analyze how the rents that the VC funds earn are divided of rents among the general
partners and the limited partners of a VC fund. Our paper is not about the division of these rents.
In fact, the VC in our model should be thought of as the general and limited partners together.
3rather debt or rather equity contracts. The result is that only equity can give the
right incentives to both parties at the margin.
Venture capital is now exported to other countries, but there are signiﬁcant bar-
riers to its ﬂow, even within the U.S.. The model therefore has meaningful cross-
economy implications. The model says that places where venture capital is scarcer
should not have appreciably diﬀerent contractual forms as long as the nature of the
projects is the same. For a wide range of distributions of project quality and of
wealth (the latter aﬀects an entrepreneur’s ability to self ﬁnance and to bypass VCs)
and for a wide range of VC supply, the observed contracts should be the same. Any
diﬀerences in contracts that did arise should show up in just two dimensions: The
share of up-front costs that the VC ﬁnances, and the VC’s share in the equity of the
project.
Notes on the literature.–Bergemann and Hege (2005), deal with a single VC and
a single entrepreneur, with their outside options taken as given. Holmes and Schmitz
(1990) analyze a market equilibrium and determine the rewards of founders relative
to managers of ﬁrms, but do not model venture capital. Inderst and Muller (2004)
model the market for venture capital as do Michelacci and Suarez (2004) who, in
addition, analyze the termination decision and link it to the equilibrium value of
aV C ,b u tw h od on o tl o o ka td a t a . U e d a( 2 0 0 4 )a n a l y z e st h em o d e - o f - ﬁnancing
decision in a model where one cost of VC ﬁnancing is the threat that the VC use the
information to set up a competing business. Cochrane (2005) deals with the valuing
the income streams to VC portfolios but does not derive optimal termination rules.
We discuss some of these papers and others further in the body of the paper.
Plan of the paper.–The next section describes the model, and Section 3 derives
the equilibrium contract and shows that the competitive outcome is eﬃcient. Section
4 derives several empirical implications of the model and discusses evidence. Section
5 solves an example by hand and ﬁts it to longitudinal data on VC investments,
spanning 1989-2000, and their performance outcomes. Section 6 concludes the paper
and the Appendix describes the data and the estimation procedure.
2M o d e l
There is a measure x of inﬁnitely lived VCs, each able to raise a suﬃcient amount of
money at the rate r. There is also an inﬂow at the rate λ of potential projects, each
in the possession of a diﬀerent entrepreneur. The entrepreneurs cannot borrow, and
have initial wealth w which is distributed according to the C.D.F. Ψ. An entrepreneur
can have at most one project, ever.
AP r o j e c t
For a project to succeed, it requires an immediate payment of a cost C,a n da f t e r
that it also requires k units of investment and a units of eﬀort by E at every instant
up until the project yields a payoﬀ. A project can be undertaken by an entrepreneur
4(E) alone, in which case she must rely on her own wealth only, or together with a
VC. The project yields a payoﬀ π at time τ, where π and τ are random variables
independent of each other. Let G be the C.D.F. of π,a n dg its density. Let F be
the C.D.F. of τ, and f its density. Both G and F are supported on R+. Assume
that the hazard rate f/(1 − F)=h is bell shaped: It ﬁrst increases up to the modal
age, τm,, then decreases. In other words, as time passes without realization of τ,t h e
agents ﬁr s tb e c o m em o r eo p t i m i s t i ca b o u taq u i c kr e a l i z a t i o no fτ, then increasingly
pessimistic.6
If the project is either not invested into or eﬀort is not exerted, the project cannot
yield a positive payoﬀ,e v e r . N e i t h e rp a r t yk n o w sπ and τ, but their distributions
are common knowledge. In a VC-backed ﬁrm, after the contract is signed and after
E incurs C, π becomes known to both parties. However, no information about τ is
received. In a solo venture, E alone incurs C at the outset, and thereby she learns π.
The expected social value to developing projects is assumed to be positive. That
is, if ﬁnancing decisions regarding the project are made optimally, it yields a positive
payoﬀ in expectation.
Preferences
All agents are risk neutral and discount the future at the rate r.U t i l i t y i s a d -
ditively separable in consumption and leisure. The VC maximizes the expected dis-
counted present value of his net income. The entrepreneur maximizes the expected
discounted present value of her income minus the stream of her exerted eﬀorts.
Market Structure
When E gets an idea, she has to decide whether to abandon her project, to seek
VC-backing, or to go solo, i.e., to implement her project alone. This decision is
irreversible.
Suppose that at time t there is a measure n of VCs who is not in a contractual
relationship with entrepreneurs and a measure of m of entrepreneurs who wishes to
be ﬁnanced by a VC. Then the number min{n,m} of VCs and entrepreneurs are
randomly matched and can enter into a contract.
Timing
Events occur in the following sequence:
1. Entrepreneur chooses whether to (i) abandon her project, (ii) develop her
project on her own, or (iii) sign a contract with a VC,
2. Under option (ii) or (iii),Cis incurred immediately,
6Jeremy Stein suggested the name “waiting-at-the-altar” hazard: The bride is unlikely to show
up early, and the chances of her showing up rise at ﬁr s t .B u ta f t e rac e r t a i np o i n ti ts t a r t st ol o o k
like the bride will not show up at all. Our results would follow more easily if the hazard were to
decline monotonically throughout. The bell-shape assumption conforms better to facts.
53. π is then revealed.
Contracting
Feasible Contracts.–The contract the VC can oﬀer consists of two positive num-
bers: (p,s).T h en u m b e rp is a lump sum the VC pays E right after signing a contract.
In that case E bears only C − p o ft h eu p - f r o n tc o s t . T h en u m b e rs speciﬁes how
to share the payoﬀ if the project succeeds. If the project yields payoﬀ π, E gets
sπ and the VC gets (1 − s)π. Neither E’s eﬀort nor the VC’s subsequent invest-
ment are contractible. On the other hand the payments p and the sharing rule s are
enforceable.
After the transfer p, this is a pure equity contract. We could allow for more
complicated contracts in which s would depend on τ and π. We shall show, however,
that these simple contracts already induce socially eﬃcient decisions. Moreover, the
equilibrium outcome of a game with more complicated contracts would be identical
to ours.
Timing of the Contractual Relationship –First, the VC oﬀers a contract, (p,s),
to E. If E refuses the contract the game between these two parties ends; E then has to
abandon the project, whereas the VC seeks to be matched with another entrepreneur.
If E signs the contract she receives p from the VC up front. We interpret p as
the amount that the VC pays towards ﬁnancing C. The entrepreneur ﬁnances the
remaining part of C and both parties then immediately learn the value of π.
At each date, if the payoﬀ h a sn o ty e tb e e nr e a l i z e d ,Eh a st od e c i d ew h e t h e rt o
exert eﬀort and the VC has to decide whether to invest. One can assume that the
parties can observe the history of investments and eﬀort up to time t,w h e nm a k i n g
these decisions.7 If the VC decides not to invest into the project, he is free to devote
his time to another project. If E decides not to exert eﬀort anymore, she leaves the
market.
If the project yields a payoﬀ π at time t,Eg e t ssπ the VC gets (1 − s)π and the
game ends between the two parties. Again, the VC seeks a new match, and E leaves
the market.
Banks
In our model, banks guarantee a risk-free interest rate, but they do not ﬁnance
projects. This is because VCs are assumed to have two advantages over banks. First,
banks lack the expertise of the VCs and entrepreneurs; banks can learn π only at
the date of success, τ, not before. Second, banks also lack the monitoring ability of
the VCs which ensures that Es do not divert investment to private consumption. As
a result, banks do not oﬀer contracts to entrepreneurs, for otherwise anybody could
7So as to avoid coordination problems, we assume that at time t the VC observes the history
of eﬀorts on the interval [0,t) and that the entrepreneur observes the history of investments on the
interval [0,t]. Our equilibrium remains an equilibrium even if neither party observes whether the
other is supporting the project.
6pretend to be an E and divert the borrowed funds for personal use, so that banks
would make negative proﬁts.
3A n a l y s i s
First, we characterize the socially optimal outcome of our economy. Then we show
that this outcome is the unique outcome in the competitive market conditional on
some distributional assumption on the wealth of Es.
3.1 Socially Optimal Decisions
We proceed as follows. First, we analyze the optimal decision regarding how long a
project should be supported. This decision depends on whether the project is VC
backed or supported by a solo entrepreneur. Second, we characterize the socially
optimal decision whether E should go solo, seek VC backing, or abandon her project.
3.1.1 The termination problem and the social value of a VC
The VC faces no budget constraint, that is, he is able to ﬁnance a project at any
moment of time no matter what the payoﬀs of previously supported projects were. He
can, however, handle only one project at a time. The social value of a VC is positive
b e c a u s eh ei sa b l et os u p p o r tp r o j e c t st h a to t h e r w i s ew o u l dn o tb ei m p l e m e n t e d .
The Social Value of a VC.– I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ea s s u m et h a tV C sﬁnance only
those entrepreneurs who would otherwise abandon their projects. (Later this becomes
a result.) Denote the social value of a free VC by W. A free VC immediately matches
with an E, the cost C is incurred, and π is revealed. Then the planner decides how long
to support the project if it does not yield fruit, T (π). As soon as the project succeeds
or is terminated, the VC becomes free and generates a value of W as of then. Hence,
the social value of the VC can be expressed as the sum of the discounted expected














−rT(π) (1 − F [T (π)])dG(π).
(1)
Let us explain the RHS of (1). First the beneﬁt: Suppose that π is revealed after C is
sunk and that the planner supports the project up to time T. The expected beneﬁt




−rtf (t)dt + e
−rT (1 − F [T])W,
8This equation has a unique solution for W.T h i si sb e c a u s et h eR H Si sp o s i t i v ea tW =0since
the social value of the project is positive, and its slope is less than one by the Envelope Theorem.
7Figure 1: The determination of T∗ (π)
b e c a u s ei ty i e l d sπat time t with likelihood f (t) if t ≤ T, in which case the beneﬁt
is π + W. If the project does not succeed until time T it is then terminated with
probability (1 − F [T]) and its only beneﬁtt h e ni sW. Second, the cost: What
m e a s u r eo fp r o j e c t sw i l lr e q u i r ei n v e s t m e n ta tt i m et?I f t>Tthen the project
surely exited already and no investment is made. If t ≤ T then a proportion F (t)
of the projects succeeded, and therefore only a measure of 1 − F (t) of them need






























−rT (1 − F [T])W
¾
. (2)
An interior solution for this problem, T∗ (π),m u s ts o l v ef o rt the ﬁrst-order condition
a + k + rW = πh(t). (3)
The LHS of (3) is the cost of waiting another instance: The physical cost, a+k,a n d
the opportunity cost, rW. The RHS is the expected beneﬁt. The local second-order
condition is h0 (T∗ (π)) < 0.S i n c eh is bell shaped, this condition is also suﬃcient, as
Figure 1 shows.
Notice however, that π may be so low that the project yields a negative expected
payoﬀ for all T>0.L e t πmin be the smallest value of π for which it is worth
8supporting the project for a strictly positive T. Then, as Figure 1 shows, the optimal










3.1.2 The solo entrepreneur’s termination problem
A solo entrepreneur may run out of money and have to terminate her project. Con-
sider an E with wealth w. Since utility is linear in consumption, E will optimally
defer all her consumption until the project is completed.9 Let wt denote E’s wealth
at time t given that her project did not succeed up to time t.T h e nwt is deﬁned by
the diﬀerential equation ˙ wt = rwt−k. The initial condition is w0 = w−C because C
must be incurred immediately. In addition, at each instance of time, E has to invest












Let τ (w) be the date at which this entrepreneur’s wealth runs out. Then τ (w) solves











∞ if w ≥ k
r + C.
(5)
The unconstrained entrepreneur.–Suppose ﬁrst that w ≥ k/r + C,t h a ti s ,E
has enough money to ﬁnance her project forever. Since new ideas occur only to
new entrepreneurs, if she terminates the project prior to success E gets zero as her












The solution, TE (π), is either equal to zero, or solves for t the ﬁrst-order condition
a + k = πh(t) and the second-order condition h0 ¡
TE [π]
¢
< 0.L e tπE
min denote the











9In general entrepreneurs save more in order to get around liquidity constraints — see Buera
(2004) and Basaluzzo (2004).
9The wealth-constrained entrepreneur.–Suppose now that w<k / r+ C.A f t e r












At an interior solution, the optimal stopping time, TE
w (π), solves for t the following
ﬁrst-order condition:
πh(t) ≥ a + k
and it holds with equality whenever TE
w (π) ≤ τ [w]. Therefore, if the project is worth





it is zero. Let πE
min (w) be the smallest payoﬀ for which it is worth starting to support
the project. Any project with quality below πmin (w) would be terminated at once.
Hence, TE











if π>π min (w),
0 otherwise. (8)
3.1.3 The Socially Optimal Financing Mode






The next lemma characterizes some important features of the curve QE.
Lemma 1 (i) For w<k / r+ C, ∂QE/∂w > 0.( i i )F o rw ≥ k
r + C, ∂QE/∂w =0
and QE (w) >C .
The intuition behind statement (i) of this lemma is the following. A budget-
constrained entrepreneur can use an additional dollar to prolong the time of support-
ing her project, instead of using it to consume. Since sometimes it is socially eﬃcient
to ﬁnance the project longer than the budget-constrained entrepreneur can aﬀord,
she can generate a positive surplus.
An entrepreneur with w>k / r+C can already support her project as long as it is
socially optimal. She would invest her additional dollar at the rate r. This additional
dollar does not generate excess return over the interest rate of a bank, explaining why
the slope of QE is zero in this region. Since the expected social value of a project is
positive by assumption, QE (w) >Cwhenever w>k / r+ C. This explains part (ii)
of the lemma.
Going solo or abandoning the project. –Suppose, ﬁrst, that VC backing was not
an option. The payoﬀ to going solo with wealth w is w − C + QE (w).W e n o w
explain why this payoﬀ must look as drawn in Figure 2. It is not deﬁned for w<C
10 
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Figure 2: The determination of w∗
because E cannot pay C.A t w = C, it is zero because after paying C,Eh a sn o
money left to invest in the project. Thereafter, by part (i) of Lemma 1, the slope
exceeds unity. As w reaches k/r + C, w − C + QE (w) reaches w + σ, where σ>0
because QE (k/r + C) >Cby part (ii) of Lemma 1. The payoﬀ is continuous in
w, hence from the Intermediate Value Theorem it follows that there exists a value
of wealth, denoted by w∗, were the payoﬀ curve intersects with the 450 line, that is,
QE (w∗)=C. Moreover, at any intersection, the slope of w − C + QE (w) is strictly
larger than unity, and therefore the intersection, w∗, is unique. The entrepreneur
with wealth w∗ is indiﬀerent between going solo and abandoning the project.
Who should get VC-backing?–We shall assume that there are many poor entre-
preneurs, with wealth below w∗ who, in the absence of VCs, would abandon their
projects. Then, it is socially optimal for VCs to back only entrepreneurs that have






At any point in time, the rate at which free VCs ﬂow in is x/¯ t.T h e i n ﬂow of
entrepreneurs is λ and, of these, a measure λΨ(w∗) would abandon their projects





we have the following result:
11Proposition 1 If (9) holds, the socially optimal outcome is described as follows:
(i) An entrepreneur with initial wealth w>w ∗ goes solo. A measure of x/¯ t
entrepreneurs gets VC-backing at every instance of time, each of them with wealth
less than w∗. The rest abandon their projects.
(ii) The termination of a VC-backed project is determined by (4), and that of the
solo project by (8).
3.2 The Competitive Outcome
We now derive conditions under which the social optimum is a competitive equilib-
rium.
For the VC to take socially optimal decisions, his market value must, as we shall
show, coincide with his social value. But this can happen only if VCs can extract all
the surplus from projects. They will have such market power if they support only
projects that would otherwise be abandoned. The latter, in turn, arises if there are
more poor entrepreneurs than there are free VCs.
But this is not the whole story. Since investment and eﬀort are not contractible,
the VCs must be able to provide contracts to Es that induce socially eﬃcient ter-
mination by both parties while, at the same time, transferring all the surplus to the
VC. We shall show that such contracts exist.
The Equilibrium Contract.–Recall that a contract consists of two numbers (p,s),
where p is paid by the VC to E before π is realized, and s is the sharing rule upon




a + k + rW
, (10)
the termination rules of both parties are indeed socially optimal.
But how can the VC extract the whole surplus from the entrepreneur? The VC
enjoys all the rents if and only if the entrepreneur enjoys none. The entrepreneur’s
payoﬀ from the contract (p,s∗) conditional on both parties supporting the project up
to T∗ (π) is











Hence, the VC extracts all the rents if
p











Moreover, once terminated by a VC, the entrepreneur would not wish to continue
the project alone (either through self ﬁnance or bank ﬁnance) because the VC retains
his equity in the project even after ceasing to invest in it. Thus the entrepreneur’s
12wealth, w






w* C - p*
Ψ
Figure 3: The equilibrium allocation of entrepreneurs to activities
reward would not rise, but her costs would, and so she would strictly prefer to stop
right away.
The selection of entrepreneurs into activities.–Entrepreneurs’ choices of the mode
of investment are described in Figure 3. If p∗ <C , the VC does not pay the entire ﬁxed
cost. The entrepreneur must pay C − p∗ up front, and some potential entrepreneurs
will have wealth insuﬃcient to cover this amount. These are people with wealth
below C −p∗ in Figure 3. The fraction of entrepreneurs that wish to get VC backing
is Ψ(w∗).B u t t h e f r a c t i o n t h a t c a n a l s o a ﬀord to pay the cost of C − p is just
Ψ(w∗) − Ψ(C − p). This is the area “Abandon or VC” in Figure 3. Hence the
distributional assumption we need is
Ψ(w





If the previous inequality holds, then (i) there are enough poor entrepreneurs who
prefer to go with a VC and, (ii) among these there are enough who have enough
wealth to ﬁnance their share of C. N o t i c et h a t( 1 2 )r e q u i r e sw∗ to be larger than
C − p∗. In addition, in order to interpret p∗ as the part of the cost C paid by the






Proof. See Appendix A.
Finally, we are ready to claim the following
13 
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Figure 4: The determination of p when s = s∗.
Theorem 1 (The Welfare Theorem) If (12) holds, the socially optimal outcome
coincides with the unique competitive equilibrium outcome in which the allocations
are supported by the following strategies:
(i) A VC always oﬀers the contract (p∗,s ∗) given by (10) and (11). If the contract
is accepted, he follows the socially optimal decisions, deﬁned by (4).
(ii) An entrepreneur with wealth w ≥ w∗ goes solo and follows the socially optimal
termination rule deﬁned by (8).
(iii) An entrepreneur with wealth w ∈ (p∗,w ∗) seeks VC-backing with probabil-
ity x/(¯ tλ[Ψ(w∗) − Ψ(C − p∗)]) and abandons her project otherwise. Entrepreneurs
seeking VC backing accept the contract oﬀered by the VC, and follow the socially
optimal decisions deﬁned by (4).
(iv) An entrepreneur with wealth w ≤ C − p∗ abandons her project.
The equilibrium is further described in Figure 4. In the ﬁgure, as p varies, s is
held ﬁxed at s∗. The vertical axis measures the up-front cost to E. The Figure shows
the following:
1. If there were no VCs, Ψ(w∗) entrepreneurs would abandon their projects, and
the remaining 1 − Ψ(w∗) w o u l dg os o l oa ss h o w ni nF i g u r e s2a n d3 .
2. Since abandoning her project oﬀers E zero rents, Es’ demand for VCs is inﬁnitely
elastic at C − p∗ up to the point Ψ(w∗) − Ψ(C − p∗) (The poorest Ψ(C − p∗)
entrepreneurs cannot aﬀord the up-front cost).
143. As p rises above p∗ some of Es that would otherwise go solo would start switching
to VCs. In addition, some other Es, who had insuﬃcient liquidity to pay their
part of the ﬁxed cost earlier, can now aﬀord to contract with VCs instead of
abandoning their projects.
3.3 Proof of the Welfare Theorem
First, we prove that given the decision about the ﬁnancing mode, Es’ as well as the
VCs’ decisions regarding the termination time of a project are indeed socially optimal.
That is, we prove the second parts of claims (i), (ii), and (iii) of Theorem 1. If E
decides to go solo, then she is the one who incurs all the costs related to the project,
but she also enjoys all the potential beneﬁts. In other words, her costs and beneﬁts
are identical to the social costs and beneﬁts, hence she follows the socially optimal
decision rules described by (8). Therefore, we only have to show these claims for
VC-backed projects.
Second, we show that given the termination times, the decisions regarding the
ﬁnancing mode are as described in the ﬁrst parts of claims (ii), (iii), and (iv) of the
theorem.
Since the VC extracts all the surplus, he has no incentive to oﬀer a diﬀerent
contract. For the same reason, Es with w ∈ [C − p∗,w ∗] are indiﬀerent between the
three options.
Incentive Compatibility and Optimality of the Contract (p∗,s ∗)
We now analyze the incentives of the agents to support the project after a contract
(p,s) is signed and both parties learn the value of π.
Entrepreneur. – I fEt r u s t st h a tt h ep r o j e c ti sa l w a y sﬁnanced by the VC, and that
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< 0. Finally, if π is below a cutoﬀ, denoted by πE
c , she does not start to
exert eﬀort.
VC.–In equilibrium, the market value of a free VC is just W.I fV Ct r u s t st h a t
E will always support the project, and that he, VC, gets (1 − s∗)π if the project
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The suﬃcient condition is again h0 ¡
TVC[π]
¢
< 0.I fπ is lower than a cutoﬀ,d e n o t e d
by πVC
c , the VC does not invest in the project.
Incentive compatibility.–E and the VC stop supporting the project at the same










c . First, suppose that
the solutions for both (14) and (16) are interior. Equations (15) and (17) deﬁne the











(a + k + rW)
, (18)
which is exactly the deﬁnition of s∗. It remains to show that the solution to (14) is
interior if and only if the solution to (16) is interior. That is, the cutoﬀs, under which
agents refuse to support the project, are the same for E and the VC. We show more:





Optimality.–We argue that the termination decisions described above are the
socially optimal ones. First of all, by Lemma 3, those projects which are socially
eﬃcient to abandon right after paying C are also abandoned in equilibrium. Second,
from (4) the socially optimal termination decision, T∗ (π), regarding a project which
is worth starting to support, satisﬁes h(T∗ (π)) = (a + k + rW)/π. Hence, in order




a + k + rW
π
,
which is satisﬁed by (18).
The Choice of Financing Mode of an Entrepreneur
W en o ws h o wt h eﬁrst parts of claims (ii), (iii),a n d(iv) of Theorem 1.
Suppose ﬁrst, that E has initial wealth w ≤ C − p∗. Then, she cannot contract
with a VC, because she cannot ﬁnance C −p∗ up-front. By Lemma 2 w<w ∗, hence
s h ei sb e t t e ro ﬀ abandoning than going solo.
Suppose that w ∈ (C − p∗,w ∗).S i n c e w<w ∗, E is still better oﬀ abandoning
than going solo. However, she has enough wealth to ﬁnance C − p∗ of the ﬁxed
16cost. Since the VCs extract all the surplus from the projects, these Es are indiﬀerent
between seeking VC-backing and abandoning. So they can randomize according to
claim (iii) of Theorem 1.
If w>w ∗, E goes solo, since her payoﬀ, w − C + QE (w),i sl a r g e rt h a nw,a n d
her other options all provide her with a payoﬀ of w.
Uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium actions.–The project-acceptance and
termination decisions are uniquely determined, as is the equilibrium contract (p∗,s ∗).
The proof of uniqueness goes as follows. In any equilibrium, the VC-backed entre-
preneurs do not enjoy any rent. Furthermore, at the equilibrium stopping time, both
parties are indiﬀerent between supporting and abandoning the project. These two
observations imply that the Bellman equation deﬁning the market value of a VC is
identical to (1). Since (1) had a unique solution, the market value of a VC is also
uniquely determined, and equals his social value. If the VC were to oﬀer any other
contract it would have to attain this value W and implement the actions (πmin,T∗).
3.4 Discussion of the Welfare Theorem
There are two reasons why here the validity of the First Welfare Theorem might
seem surprising. First, agency problems could arise, since neither VC investment
nor E’s eﬀort is contractible. Second, agents are not price-takers — VCs are strategic
when oﬀering contracts. Next, we explain why the competitive equilibrium is eﬃcient
despite of these problems.
Discussion of the Equilibrium Contract
We emphasize that the validity of the Welfare Theorem in our model is due to
the existence of institutions and not a natural feature of the world. More precisely, it
is the contractibility of the proﬁt sharing rule that makes it possible for both E and
the VC to make socially optimal decisions.
Intuition for the equilibrium contract.–T h eV Ca n dEm u s tb eg i v e nt h ei n c e n -
tive to both support the project exactly up to T∗ (π).T h ee q u i t ys∗ in (10) provides
both the right incentives because the marginal cost of a VC-backed project is shared
correctly between the VC and E. The VC invests k and incurs an opportunity cost
of rW, while E exerts eﬀort a. Then E cares only about her own cost, a, and not
the social cost a + k + rW.H o w e v e r , i f s = a/(a + k + rW), then E’s beneﬁti s
[a/(a + k + rW)]π, instead of the social beneﬁt π. This means that the objective
function of E is the objective function of the social planner down-scaled by the con-
stant a/(a + k + rW). Similarly, the objective function of the VC is down-scaled by
(k + rW)/(a + k + rW). Scaling does not aﬀect decisions, however, and the VC and
E both choose the same T as the planner would. Therefore, our model explains why
we observe equity contracts between VCs and Es, and not, e.g., debt-contracts.
Debt contracts.–If the VC and E signed a debt contract, E would have to incur
the total cost of a project on the margin. But if, as we assume, E would have to
repay that debt from the project’s payoﬀ, π,h e rm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt from a succeeding
17project would be less than π, i.e., strictly less than the social marginal beneﬁt. This
would induce E to terminate the project too early. Thus, debt contracts would induce
ineﬃcient terminations.
Labor contracts.–If eﬀort were observable, the VC could hire E as a worker and
induce the eﬃcient outcome. If E were to receive a wage of a at each instant, she
would be exactly compensated for her eﬀort, and would hence be willing to accept
such a contract. The VC would then internalize the social costs and beneﬁts of the
project, and both parties would make socially optimal decisions. Such a contract,
however, is not robust to the observability of E’s eﬀort. Had the VC not been able to
observe E’s eﬀort, E would strictly prefer to shirk for two reasons. First, if she shirked,
she would not incur the disutility of working. Second, by shirking she would prevent
the project from succeeding, and would thereby prolong the time during which she
received the wage. In our equilibrium, on the other hand, the observability of the
eﬀort (and even the observability of the project still being alive) plays absolutely no
role because s∗ gives E and the VC exactly the right incentive to support the project.
Discussion of the VC’s market value
In order to achieve eﬃciency, the social value of a VC must coincide with his
market value. Condition (12) contains two assumptions: (A) There must be fewer
V C st h a nt h e r ea r eE st h a ts e e kV C - b a c k i n g ,a n d( B )A m o n gt h e s eE st h e r em u s tb e
suﬃciently many that can aﬀord to pay C −p∗ up-front. (A) is crucial to our result,
for it provides the VCs with market power and with the ability to oﬀer contracts
that enable them to extract the full surplus from a project. That is why the market
value and the social value of a free VC are the same. But (B) is less important
and can be easily relaxed by introducing more complicated contracts. The VCs could
extract surplus from more liquidity constrained entrepreneurs if the sharing rule s was
increasing over time. Recall that we have restricted attention to time-independent
sharing rules, and hence the entrepreneur was only indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort
and shirking at the time of termination, but strictly preferred to exert eﬀort anytime
before. If s was allowed to change over time, the entrepreneur could have been
made indiﬀerent between working and shirking at times before the termination of
the project, and by such contracts surplus could have been extracted from poorer
entrepreneurs without violating incentive constraints.
In the search-matching models of Inderst and Muller (2004) and Michelacci and
Suarez (2004), Nash bargaining divides the rents between the VC and E. The “Hosios
condition” (which states that factor shares in the constant-returns-to-scale matching
function should equal the factors’ relative bargaining strength) must hold for the
equilibrium to be eﬃcient. It is pure coincidence if that equality should obtain,
and so generically these models imply ineﬃciency of equilibria — policies that change
incentives for entry by one side or the other can generally improve the sum of the
payoﬀs. In our model, by contrast, eﬃciency holds on an open set of all parameter
values; since w∗,p ∗,a n d¯ t are continuous in the parameters of the model, condition
(12) holds for a large range of parameters. It is true that our model takes the relative
18numbers of Es and VCs as exogenous. Since VCs get the full social value of their
capital, if we endogenized venture capital we would expect that an optimal amount
of it would be created.
Bergemann and Hege (2005, henceforth BH) argue that dynamic contracts be-
t w e e nE sa n dV C sa r ei n e ﬃcient relative to ﬁrst best. In their model the project
succeeds with some probability in each period, and the payoﬀ is proportional to the
invested funds. As in our setup, as time passes without success, agents become more
and more pessimistic but, in contrast to our model, E can divert the invested funds to
private consumption (with or) without the VC observing it. The authors show that
the project is supported for a time that is shorter than would be socially eﬃcient, and
it gets less funds. The explanation is that in order to provide E with proper incentives,
the optimal contract must specify a decreasing stream of investment funds. While in
BH incentives cause early and ineﬃcient terminations of VC-backed projects, in our
model the VC’s high opportunity cost result in early, yet eﬃcient, terminations. In
any case, it would seem that the closeness of VC oversight makes it hard for E to
divert funds to consumption.
4 Empirical implications
This section discusses some qualitative implications and assumptions of the model
and compares them with evidence.
1. The market power of the VC.–(12) implies that in Figure 4 the supply of VCs
is to the left of the kink in the demand curve. Small shifts in supply should leave
the equilibrium return to venture capital unchanged. In support of this, Kaplan and
Schoar (2005, Table 13) ﬁnd that the entry of new funds does not signiﬁcantly reduce
returns on venture funds. But a small shift in the supply of VCs should also not
aﬀect the terms of the contracts, their duration, or the total amount invested, and
here the evidence is less favorable: Gompers and Lerner (2000) ﬁnd that outward
shifts in the supply of venture capital act to raise the total amount that VCs pay
into the companies they oversee, and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (forthcoming)
ﬁnd that the likelihood of getting to IPO rises after a positive shock to the supply of
funds.
2. The excess rate of return to VCsa n dEs.–Having estimated the model’s
parameters exclusively from the data on VC-backed projects, we can calculate the
excess return that solo Es earn on their investments. This excess return depends on
E’s wealth. Figure 5 is based on our estimated model in which E’s excess return
which never reaches that of the VC. At w∗, Ei si n d i ﬀerent between going solo and
abandoning the project, hence there her excess return is zero. It then rises with E’s
level of wealth, becoming ﬂat when w = C + k/r, i.e., the point where the solo E
ceases to be liquidity constrained in any state of the world, i.e., for any realization of
π. The formulas are in the Appendix. The second panel of Figure 5 is the estimated
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Figure 5: The excess return of solo entrepreneurs
analog of Figure 2. At $28 million, w∗ is quite large. This estimate comes about
b e c a u s ew ee s t i m a t eC to be $6.4 million. In our model a solo E expects to earn
at least the market rate, and therefore she cannot have a negative alpha. There
is evidence of negative alphas for some Es (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002)
and independent inventors (Astebro 2003), and further work should reveal what may
explain such patterns. Recently, however, Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2004) and
Miao and Wang (2005) have argued that when one factors in the option value of the
project, the alphas are nonnegative. This exercise should be qualiﬁed by noting that
the types of ventures that VCs fund are high-tech and require more funding than the
average small business.
3. Terminations.–VCs are less patient with their projects than rich Es, and
therefore are more likely to terminate a non-performing venture. We cannot rank
terminations of VC-backed ﬁrms and those of poor Es because on the one hand, the
VC is less patient, but on the other, the poor entrepreneur may run out of money.
This may explain why Manigart et al. (2002) and Goldfarb et al. (2006) ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the failure hazards in the two populations. In contrast,
Ber and Yafeh (2004) ﬁnd that the probability of survival until the IPO stage is higher
for VC-backed companies. Nevertheless, based on Figure 6, we know that VC-backed
ﬁrms must have higher termination hazards initially.
4. Value at IPO.–Hochberg (2004) ﬁnds that the stock-market value of IPO is
higher when a VC is present, and Megginson and Weiss (1991, Table III) ﬁnd this to
be true even when one controls for book values. In our model, book value presumably
is C +tk,s ot h a t ,g i v e nt, the book values of VC-backed and solo ﬁrms would be the
same. The average market value of a VC-backed company that succeeds at age t is
E
¡
π| TVC(π) ≥ t
¢
, and its counterpart for the value of a solo ﬁrm run by a rich E is
20min
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Figure 6: Date-zero terminations by VC and solo firms
E
¡
π| TE (π) ≥ t
¢
.S i n c eTVC and TE are both increasing in π, E
¡
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The proof ﬁrst shows that the VC is more selective at age zero than E, that is, his






This is because the VC only starts supporting a project if it yields at least an expected
payoﬀ of W,w h i l ef o rar i c hs o l oEi ts u ﬃces that it yield a positive proﬁt. The proof
then shows that the VC is more selective at all ages than the rich E, because —
while the marginal beneﬁto fw a i t i n gi st h es a m ef o raV Ca n dE—f o rt h eV Ct h e
marginal cost is higher by the amount rW. Figure 6 illustrates (20) about age-zero
terminations, and it portrays πE
min (w) for all w, the shape of which is based on the
following result, also proved in Appendix A:
Proposition 3 TE
w (π) is increasing in w and constant on [C + k/r,∞).
Therefore poor Es are also more selective than rich Es at age zero, and, according
to (8), equally selective afterwards, as long as their funds last. Therefore expected
market-book ratios of VC-backed ﬁrms exceed those for rich Es, but not necessarily
those of poor Es.
5. Age at IPO.–VC-backed IPOs should be stochastically younger, in the ﬁrst-
order sense, than the rich-solo IPOs, but they can be stochastically older than the
IPOs of liquidity-constrained Es; the latter is true, roughly, if the liquidity constraint
bites earlier than the VC’s impatience constraint. The data on age of IPOs since ﬁrm
21Figure 7: distribution of age (since founding) at IPO
founding on the NYSE and Nasdaq shown in Figure 7 turn out to be somewhere in
between — it excludes spinout and rollup (i.e., consolidation) IPOs in the plots, but
including them would not change the results.
6. Financing is staged and good projects receive more investment rounds.–The
VC infuses further capital at various points if and only if E has exerted eﬀort —
capital infusions are a part of an incentive contract to help elicit good behavior from
E. Moreover, the duration of investment depends on π. Gompers (1995) ﬁnds that
bad VC-backed projects are dropped and that good projects get more investment.
This happens in our model; the duration of investment rises with π:P r o j e c t sw i t h










because at the point of intersection h0 < 0. Since T∗ = TVCM, this proves the claim
for the VC-backed projects, and diﬀerentiation in (8) establishes the same property
for TE
w .
5 Adding random delay to the signal on π
The model says that all projects for which π ≤ πmin are dropped at once. Our data
show that while some terminations do occur early, they don’t occur immediately.
This could be because it takes time to learn π and so we shall now introduce a delay
22in receiving the signal about π. This extension does not aﬀect our theoretical results
and our welfare theorem still holds, but the modiﬁed model will ﬁt the data better.
Suppose that a perfect signal on π arrives at date x,a n dt h a tx has distribution
B and density b.
VC-backed projects.–If x =0 , the planner’s problem is the same as that in Section
3.1.1, and conditional on W, the solution, T∗, is again (4), with πVC
min still being the
cutoﬀ π.B u tf o rx>0,t h ec u t o ﬀ is diﬀerent from πVC
min for two reasons. First, the
costs incurred for t ∈ [0,x] are now sunk and, second, the waiting time to success is
now F (t | t>x ). Therefore the cutoﬀ,c a l li tπmin (x), is the largest value of π that
solves
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The marginal condition for T is still (3), and so if x<T ∗ (π) and if π>π min (x),t h e
project is still terminated at time T∗ (π).B u t i f x ≥ T∗ (π) or if π ≤ πmin (x),t h e
project is terminated at x, i.e., at once. To sum up: The optimal stopping time of a




T∗ (x) if π>π min (x),
x otherwise.
Let T0 denote the age at which the planner terminates a project about which no
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−rT0 (1 − F(T0)W.
Hence, the Bellman equation deﬁning W is











where T0 denotes the termination time of a project with unknown π.L e tT∗
0 denote
the solution to the maximization problem on the right-hand side of (22). Appendix
Ap r o v e s
Lemma 4 The First-Order Condition corresponding to (22) is












1 − F (T∗
0)
dG(π), (23)
where δ = b/(1 − B) denotes the hazard rate of the signal.
23The LHS of (23) is the marginal cost of waiting. The RHS, the marginal beneﬁt,
decomposes into two terms: First, the project might succeed in the next instant; the
likelihood of this event is h(T∗
0), and the expected payoﬀ is just
R
πdG(π),s i n c e
no selection on π has yet occurred. Second, the signal on π may arrive in the next
instant; the likelihood of this event is δ(T∗
0), and the project’s value changes from
VT∗
0 (π,∞) to VT∗
0 (π,T∗
0).
Solo Es.–A rich solo E solves the same problem as the one above, except W =0
in all formulas. An E facing budget constraint again terminates either at the same
time as a rich solo E would, or when he runs out of money. This is true for x above
t h em o d eo fh.T ot h el e f to ft h em o d e ,h o w e v e r ,πminsd e p e n do nb o t hx and w,a n d
they solve the analog of (21). We shall plot πmin (x,w) in Appendix B.
6F i t t i n g d a t a
Data description.–The data comprise VC investments in U.S. portfolio companies
founded between 1989 and 1993. Follow-on investments in these companies extend to
2001. The data are from the VentureXpert database provided by Thompson Venture
Economics. They follow 1745 companies. After dropping inconsistent, irrelevant, and
missing data, the ﬁnal data cover $27 billion of venture capital investment in 1355
portfolio companies, of which 25% exited through an IPO, 19% were acquired, 32%
ceased to receive venture capital ﬁnancing (terminated)10
Data Summary
age ipo acq term #evnts #left suc. hzd fail hzd
01 2 8 02 0 1 3 5 50 . 0 10 . 0 0
13 91 91 1 9 1 7 7 1 3 3 50 . 0 40 . 0 9
25 44 91 0 3 2 0 6 1 1 5 80 . 0 90 . 0 9
36 54 26 1 1 6 8 9 5 20 . 1 10 . 0 6
46 74 75 0 1 6 4 7 8 40 . 1 50 . 0 6
5 27 24 36 87 620 0.08 0.06
6 22 23 20 65 533 0.08 0.04
7 16 11 19 46 468 0.06 0.04
8 5 10 17 32 422 0.04 0.04
9 0 5 6 1 1 3 9 00 . 0 10 . 0 2
10 2 4 6 12 379 0.02 0.02
11 0 1 1 2 367 0.00 0.00
12 0 0 1 1 365 0.00 0.00
10We infer that a termination has occured 462 days after the last reported VC investment in a
terminal period of inactivity. Thus a ‘termination’ annot occur in the ﬁrst year of a ﬁrm’s life and,
hence, the ‘zero’ in the ﬁrst row of column 4. This termination criterion was imposed on this sample
in Guler (2003) and on its update in Guler (2007).
24and 19% of companies in the sample were private companies still in the process
of receiving venture capital ﬁnancing, and for them the possibility of an IPO or
acquisition was still deemed to exist as of 2001. The Table summarizes the data
focusing on the relation between the ﬁrm’s age in the ﬁrst column, and the three
events that may befall the ﬁrm.






π ≥ π0 (24)
B (x)=1 − e

















τ ≥ 0 (26)
Thus π has a Pareto distribution, x has a constant hazard, δ,a n dτ has an increasing
density below τm and a Pareto density above τm. Thus we have eight parameters:
π0,λ,δ,ρ,τm,C,k, and r. We set τm =4 .5 since this is the peak of the empirical
success-hazard rate. We set r =0 .127, w h i c hw o u l db et h er a t eo fr e t u r nr e q u i r e db y
the CAPM model given the β of VE returns and given the S&P 500 return over the
period. See the Appendix for details. This leaves us with only six free parameters:
π0,λ,δ,ρ,C,k.W eﬁt the following eight features of the data:
1. the excess return,
2. the VC’s rate of return conditional on age,
3. the cost proﬁle,
4. the cumulative cash ﬂow,
5. the equity share of E,
6. the survival function,
7. the success hazard,
8. the termination hazard.
We now discuss how each of these eight features are determined by the data, and
how we constructed their theoretical counterparts in our example. We present the
formulae for the case δ = ∞, i.e., where the signal arrives immediately. Extending
them to the case where the signal is delayed is done in the Appendix. Figure 8
represents the ﬁt of our numerical example. We start with the ﬁrst panel of Figure 8:
Panel 1: Excess Return.–We constrain the parameters to yield α =4 .8% and we
penalize highly any deviation from this value and so we end up with an ˆ α very close
to the desired value.
Panel 2: The rate of return proﬁle.–Among projects that succeed at t,t h eV C ’ s
return, call it R(t), solves the equation





r (1 − e−rt)
. (27)
25where Γ is The distribution of π among projects that succeed at time t.T h i s i s
an arithmetic return, because we ﬁrst average the payoﬀs and then take the return.
The RHS is the ratio of the present values of revenues (averaged over the whole
portfolio) to those of costs. To derive it, note that projects with π<π min are
terminated at once. Between date zero and date t = h−1 ([a + k + rW]/πmin),n o n e
are terminated, and successes come from the distribution G(π | π ≥ πmin).A t t =
h−1 ([a + k + rW]/πmin), the truncation point, (a + k + rW)/h(t) s t a r t st om o v et o
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The vertical axis in Panel 2 measures R(t) in (27). The horizontal axis measures
the ﬁrm’s age as of the date of the ﬁrst VC investment. The highest returns are
on projects that succeed early. We stop at the seventh year as data become sparse
beyond that point and are heavily inﬂuenced by outliers.
Panel 3: The cost proﬁle.–We shall ﬁt C and k to the data on the investment
proﬁle, i.e., the sequences of investment rounds, but converted to ﬂows of investment
as a function of time. The predicted ﬁrst-period investment relative to subsequent
investment is
VC’s ﬁrst-period investment






a + k + rW
.
We see some modest decline in the empirical series, but it comes several years later
than the predicted, second year.
Panel 4: The cumulative cash ﬂow.–Let J (t) b et h eV C ’ sc u m u l a t i v en e ti n c o m e .













and the initial condition J (0) = −p∗,w h e r ep∗ is given in (11). For both the model
and the data in this case, we plot medians and not means so as to minimize the eﬀect
outliers at high ages.
Panel 5:E ’ s equity.–Once E signs the contract with the VC, her share of the
project drops from unity to s∗, where it remains until the end. We ﬁt s∗ = a
a+k+rW
to Kaplan and Strömberg’s (2003, Table 2) numbers on cash ﬂow rights, i.e., claims
on equity shares. Pooled over rounds, the claim of founders is 31.1%, of VCs 46.7%,
and of non-VC investors 22.2%. Since our model does not include non-VC investors,







26Figure 8: Fit of the Pareto model when targeted α =0 .048
27The model underpredicts s∗ because it needs a large k in order to lessen the predicted
decline in Panel 3, and the ﬁnal estimate is a compromise.
Panels 6, 7 and 8: Hazards and survivorship.–A project “survives” through date
t if it has neither succeeded (τ>t ) nor been terminated (T (π) >t ). We ﬁrst need to
deﬁne terminations. By (3), π =( a + k + rW)/h(T), and so the fraction of projects
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where θ(π) ≡ g(π)/(1 − G(π)) is the hazard rate of G.S i n c eτ and π are indepen-
dent random variables, the CDF of t is 1 − S (t), where








is the model ‘Survivor function’. The last three panels of Figure are not independent:
h and ψ imply S via (33). We measure S (t) by the ‘#left.’ This is the dashed
line in panel 6 of the ﬁgure. Our measure of h, ‘suc. hzd’i sc a l c u l a t e da s( ipo +
acq)/(#left). Thus we treat IPOs and acquisitions as equivalent success realizations.
Finally, ‘fail hzd’i st h er a t i o( term)/(#left). This is the empirical counterpart of
ψ(t). The Appendix explains in detail.
Estimation procedure.–The estimates of our free parameters are determined as
the minimizers of the following loss function, RSS:
RSS = w1[ln ˆ α − ln0.048]
2 + w2
£
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2 (34)
We only penalize two out of the three functions h(t), S(t) and ψ(t) since knowledge
of two pins down the third. We chose penalties on logarithms for some moments since
28a simple quadratic scheme did not penalize absurd behavior suﬃciently; for example,
when the ratio k/C goes from 1/10 to 1/100, this is a big qualitative change in our eyes
but would not be penalized much by a purely quadratic scheme. For the weighting
scheme, we chose w =( 5 ,1,1,0.1,0.1,0.5,0.01). The high penalty on α reﬂects the
importance we attach to this parameter. The other penalties are chosen to reﬂect
the scale of the respective parameters. We used a Matlab-built-in line-search method
to minimize RSS with respect to the parameters of the model. The minimization
process proved to be very robust; the algorithm converged to the same solution for
almost any of about 100 randomly chosen starting points. The estimates are reported
together in Table 1, and some statistics of interest are reported in Table 2.
αC k π 0 λτ m ρδRSS
0.048 $ 6.4 mil. $ 3.7 mil. $ 73.2 mil. 1.91 4.50 .35 0.46 0.5259
Table 1 : Parameter Estimates
Some implications of the parameter estimates.–Note that π0, the smallest possible
π in the support of G (see (24)), is estimated to be an order of magnitude higher
than C and k. The implied returns are therefore high if they come early, but the
expected waiting time until success is inﬁnity because, since ρ<1, the tail of the
Pareto portion of F distribution is thick. According to (26), the probability that
τ ≤ τm =4 .5 y e a r s( w h i c hi sw h e nt h eh a z a r dp e a k s )i s
ρ
2+ρ = 0.35
2.35 =0 .15.T h u st h e
returns are likely to be highly skewed regardless of the shape of G,s i m p l yb e c a u s e
most of them are small, so that a large fraction is terminated. The early returns are
the big winners. On top of this G is itself right skewed, with E (π)= λπ0
λ−1 =$154 mil.
Finally, the mean signal-arrival time 1/δ =2 .2 years, i.e., the VC quickly learns the
quality of the project.
In our model, venture capital is homogeneous, but some diﬀerences could easily be
introduced. Suppose, e.g., that some VCs had better signals about a project’s likely
success, or could see them sooner. Such VCs would face a more favorable distribution
of waiting times, F, and of payoﬀs, G. Panel 1 of the Figure 8 shows that returns
drop oﬀ quickly as the waiting time increases so that an ability to bring successes
forward seems to have a very high return. If VCs diﬀered in quality because some
could see a better prior signal, then the high-quality VCs would have a W higher than
other VCs. The high-W VCs would then be more selective, having higher πminsa n d
lower T (π)s. Therefore ex-post project qualities would be positively correlated with
t h eq u a l i t i e so ft h eV C st h a tb a c k e dt h e m .T h i sw o u l db ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hS ø r e n s e n
(forthcoming) who ﬁnds that the bulk of the observed positive association between
VC quality and project quality is due not to direct VC inﬂuence on the payoﬀ but
to sorting. The following additional statistics were obtained from a Monte-Carlo
simulation of 3 million projects using the estimated parameters:
29Success rate 22.1% Screened 94.3%
Succeeded unscreened 5.4% E[x] 2.19
Success after screening 16.7% E[π] 154m$
Termination rate 77.9% E[π|success] 247m$
Terminated unscreened 0.2% E[τ|success] 6.37
Terminated on revelation of π 42.4% E[term. time|termination] 6.21
Terminated at T∗(π) 35.2%
Table 2 : Additional Statistics
7C o n c l u s i o n
We estimated a model of the market for venture capital in which VCs were scarce
relative to the number of potential projects. The estimates imply a high equilibrium
return on VC capital which makes the VCs impatient to start new funds and to
terminate existing non-performing projects. This leads to a selection eﬀe c tt h a tg i v e s
rise to a tendency for VC-backed companies to reach IPOs earlier, and to be worth
more at IPO than other start-ups. Our results show that many of the diﬀerences
between the VC-backed and solo companies can be explained without assuming that
VCs add value to projects on aside from providing liquidity, or that the VC-backed
projects are ex-ante diﬀerent from solo ones.
We used the estimated model to infer the rate of return on venture capital and on
entrepreneurship, the latter rising with the entrepreneur’s wealth. The VC earned a
higher excess return than even the wealthiest entrepreneurs, but not by much. The
equilibrium was socially optimal for a range of parameter values.
The features of the contract were also determined by a sharing rule and an up-
front payment. For a wide range of distributions of project quality and wealth on
the one hand, and for a wide range of VC supply on the other, the model says that
contracts should be the same. To the extent that they should arise at all, cross-
economy diﬀerences in contracts should be expressible in terms of just two statistics:
T h es h a r eo fu p - f r o n tc o s t st h a tt h eV Cﬁnances, and the VC’s share in the equity of
the project.
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338 Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . (i) Suppose that w<k / r + C.F r o m ( 5 ) , τ0 (w)=
1/[k − r(w − C)].S u p p o s en o w ,t h a th−1 ((a + k)/π) >τ(w).T h a ti s ,t h ep r o j e c t
with payoﬀ π is worth supporting longer than time τ (w).S i n c et h es u p p o r to fπis

































The ﬁr s tt e r mi sp o s i t i v es i n c ew<k / r+ C. The second term is also positive since
h−1 ((a + k)/π) ≥ τ (w). Suppose now that h−1 ((a + k)/π) <τ(w),t h a ti sEc a n
support the project with payoﬀ π as long as it is socially optimal. The measure of





















h(τ(w))[k−r(w−C)]e−rtf (τ (w)) if h−1 ((a + k)/π) ≥ τ (w)


















h(τ (w))π − a + k
h(τ (w))[k − r(w − C)]
e
−rtf (τ (w)) > 0.
(ii) Suppose now that w<k / r+ C, that is, E never runs out of money when she is











34and hence dQE/dw =0 . By assumption, the social value of the project is positive.
This implies that the unconstrained entrepreneur generates a larger expected payoﬀ
by optimally supporting a project than abandoning. But the payoﬀ of supporting a
project in excess to that yielded by abandoning is exactly QE (w) − C, and hence
QE (w) >C .
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that QE (w∗)=C and QE (C)=0(see Figure
2). Since QE is strictly increasing in w on [0,k/r+ C] by Lemma 1, it follows that
w∗ >C . Hence, in order to prove (13) we only have to show that p∗ > 0.W es h o w




a + k + rW
C. (36)












































−rtf (t)dt = −
Z T∗(π)
0
(1 − F (t))rWe
−rtdt
















Plugging this back to (37) we get that C − p∗ can be written as
a



































a + k + rW
[W + C − W]=
aC
a + k + rW
,




a + k + rW
,
35which is equivalent to (36).





























That is, V (π,T) (V VC(π,T),V E (π,T)) is the social (VC’s, entrepreneur’s) payoﬀ
generated from a project with payoﬀ π if it is supported up-to time T. Recall that
max
T










E (π,T)=0 ⇐⇒ π ≤ π
E
min.
First, we show that πmin = πVC
min. By (39), it is enough to show that
V (π,T)=V
VC(π,T) ⇐⇒ V (π,T)=W. (40)














































Multiplying through by (a + k + rW)/a,

























−rt(1 − F [t])dt. (41)





−rt(1 − F [t])dt = e























−rtf (t)dt + W
µ
e















−rtf (t)dt + W
µ
e
















−rtf (t)dt + We
−rT(π) (1 − F [T (π)]) − W
= V (π,T) − W.
Therefore (41) and (42) imply (40).
N o ww es h o wt h a tπmin = πE
min. From (39), it is enough to show that
V
E (π,T)=0⇐⇒ V (π,T)=W.


























B u tt h i si se x a c t l yV (π,T) − V VC(π,T) (see (41)). Hence,
V
E (π,T)=0⇔ V (π,T)=V
VC(π,T) ⇔ V (π,T)=W,
where the second equivalence follows from (40).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . First, we show that (20) holds. This would imply










−rtf (t)dt =0 .( 4 3 )




























−rtf (t)dt + e









































min)}f (t)dt ≤ W.
37The inequality follows from TE being the solo’s optimal termination rule (and not
TVC), and the last equality from (43). Since T was arbitrary in the previous inequality
chain, (44) follows.
It remained to show that (19) even if π>π min.I f π>π min then TVC(π) > 0
and by (20) TE (π) > 0.S i n c eh is decreasing at TVC(π) and TE (π),ac o m p a r i s o n
o f( 6 )a n d( 4 )i m p l i e sTE (π) >T VC(π).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . First, we show πmin (w) is decreasing in w and
constant, πE
min,o n[k/r + C,∞).R e c a l lt h a tπmin (w) can be deﬁn e ds u c ht h a t
q(π,w)=0⇔ π ≤ πmin (w).
Hence, in order to prove that πmin (w) is decreasing it is enough to show that q(π,w)
is increasing in w. Suppose that w1 >w 2. Recall from (7) that





















−rtf (t)dt = q(w1,π),
where the inequality follows because τ is increasing (see (5)). Also notice from (5) that
t h ei n e q u a l i t yi sw e a kw h e n e v e rw1,w 2 ≥ k/r + C.T h i ss h o w st h a tπmin (w)=πs
min
whenever w ≥ k/r + C.
Finally, since πmin (w) is decreasing in w and τ is increasing and constant on
[k/r + C,∞), the statement of the proposition directly follows from (8).





























∂ (1 − B (T0))V (π,∞)
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k + a + rW
h(T0)
¶
.( 4 6 )
38This latter equality follows from exactly the same argument that led to (3). Hence:

























The ﬁrst-order condition is the sum of (45) and (47) equated with zero, that is
















[V (π,T0) − V (π,∞)]dG(π).
Rearranging,
(1 − B (T
∗
0))(1 − F (T
∗
0))e












[V (π,T0) − V (π,∞)]dG(π).
After dividing through by (1 − B (T∗
0))(1 − F (T∗
0)),









V (π,T0) − V (π,∞)
1 − F (T0)
dG(π). (49)
399 Appendix B: Data and the Estimation
This Appendix was written by Matthias Kredler
9.1 Data
In general, we will denote the quantities implied by the model by plain letters (x,
e.g.), whereas the moments from the data are denoted by the same letter carrying a
hat (ˆ x).
9.1.1 The data on α and r
The value ˆ α =0 .048 that we use is inferred from the quarterly value αq =0 .0117 that
Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004) report on the bottom of panel A in their table 2. In
order to compute the discount rate r =0 .127 that we use in the computations, we
create the typical return for an investment with the characteristics of VC projects
following the capital asset pricing model (CAPM):
r = rf + βVC(rm − rf)=0 .127
We compute rf =0 .026 as the mean of the return on 3-month treasury bills from
1980 to 1999, which is the sample period for Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004)’s data.
Similarly, we compute rm =0 .082 as the mean of the return on a value-weighted
portfolio of stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ provided by the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) over the same period. The value βVC =1 .80
is calculated as the sum of the 5 quarterly β-coeﬃcients that Jones and Rhodes-
Kropf (2004) provide in their table 1, panel B.
9.1.2 The data on R(t)



















where time is counted from zero on for each project when it receives its ﬁrst investment
round. The term in brackets can be seen as the excess return over r of a big portfolio
of VC projects that succeeded after t years. Taking logs and dividing by t annualizes
this quantity. We take the logs after averaging over all projects since VC returns are
driven by outliers; there is a strong Jensen’s-inequality eﬀect that understates the
inﬂuences of big winners when logs are taken before averaging.
For r,w eu s et h es a m en u m b e ra sd e r i v e di np a r a g r a p h9 . 1 . 1 .I nt h ed e n o m i n a t o r ,
we have investment cash ﬂows for project i in year s (after the ﬁrst investment). The
data are taken again from Guler (2003). They are annualized log returns for the
projects in Guler’s sample and we reproduce them in Table A1:
40Year 1-2y 2-3y 3-4y 4-5y 5-6y 6-7y 7-8y
R(t) 1.59 0.59 0.49 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.16
Table A1
The data are also plotted as the dashed line in Panel 2 of Figure 8. We restrict it
to the years 2 to 8 for the following reasons: For projects succeeding during the ﬁrst
year, it is impossible to distinguish between investment and revenue since there is
only one net cash ﬂow in the data. For the years after the 8th year, the data become
very sparse — we have less than 10 data points in each of these years. Therefore these
are not used in the estimation.
9.1.3 The data on k/C
As a typical value for C,w et a k e ˆ C = $2.6m. This number is reported by Kaplan,
Sensoy and Strömberg (2002) in table 2 as the book value of a VC portfolio company
at the business plan in the median. In order to get an estimate ˆ k for the typical
monetary investment k that a portfolio company requires each year, we employ again
the data from Guler (2003, Table 6, column 2):
Investment round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Amount ($ millions) 6.5 5.3 5.5 7 8.4 6.4 5.9 8.2 3.4 8.1 3.4 3.4
Table A2
Because the model has k paid per unit of time and C at the outset, we need
to convert these data for spending by investment round into spending per year.B y
comparing the speed of terminations we arrived at the conversion factor for converting
rounds into ﬂows. If Ij is the average amount invested in round j,w ec o n v e r tt h i s















As an estimate for the typical yearly investment ﬂow once the initial investment round
is over, we obtain ˆ k = 1
T−1
PT
t=2 θtIt=$3.68m, again from Guler’s data. Hence the
target value becomes ˆ k/ˆ C =1 .42.
11Between the ﬁrst and the sixth round,the termination hazard falls from 0.12 to 0.08. On the
other hand, between year 1 and year 6, the termination hazard falls from 0.09 to 0.04. Thus the
ratio of the two hazards rises from 12
9 =1 .25 to 8
4 = 1
2. As a rough calculation, then, initially,
rounds are once every 1.25 years, and by year 6, they are once every 1.5 years.
419.1.4 The data on J(t)
To estimate the cumulative cash-ﬂow J(t) of a typical project, we take the average
cumulative cash-ﬂow in Guler’s data up to year t.G u l e r ’ sd a t af o rπ are the market
valuations for the respective company at IPO or at acquisition. In line with the value
s∗ =0 .40 that we use (see below), we assume that 60% of these revenues accrue to
VCs. Furthermore, for the positive cash-ﬂows in the formula for J0(t) in section 4.0.5
we calculate conditional medians at t instead of conditional means (as is done for the
statistics inferred from the model, since it is easier to evaluate)– we do this because
the mean is very sensitive to the extreme outliers that are present in Guler’s data.
We reproduce the series we obtain for ˆ J(t) in table A3 (plotted as the dashed line in
Panel 4 of Figure 8.
Y e a r 123456 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2
ˆ Jt -9.0 -8.9 -7.3 -4.3 -0.7 0.7 2.1 5.1 5.7 6.0 6.2 7.1
Table A3
9.1.5 The data on s∗
The reference value ˆ s∗ =0 .40 is taken from Kaplan and Strömberg (2002), table 2.
9.1.6 The data on S(t), h(t) and ψ(t)
These data are from the VentureExpert database provided by Venture Economics,a n d
are described in detail by Guler (2003). For clarity of the argument, the following
table reproduces the Data Summary Table from Section 6 of the paper and will help us
discuss in greater detail the data on successes and terminations and the construction
of the variables.
‘Age’ is measured as the number of periods since the date of the ﬁrst VC invest-
m e n t .N o t et h a tt h i sm e a s u r eo fa g ei sd i ﬀerent from the measure in Figure 7 where
‘age’ is time elapsed since the ﬁrm was founded.
42age ipo acq term #evnts #left ˆ h ˆ ψ
01 2 8 02 0 1 3 5 50 . 0 10 . 0 0
13 91 91 1 9 1 7 7 1 3 3 50 . 0 40 . 0 9
25 44 91 0 3 2 0 6 1 1 5 80 . 0 90 . 0 9
36 54 26 1 1 6 8 9 5 20 . 1 10 . 0 6
46 74 75 0 1 6 4 7 8 40 . 1 50 . 0 6
52 72 43 68 7 6 2 00 . 0 80 . 0 6
62 22 32 06 5 5 3 30 . 0 80 . 0 4
71 61 11 94 6 4 6 80 . 0 60 . 0 4
8 5 10 17 32 422 0.04 0.04
9 0 5 6 1 1 3 9 00 . 0 10 . 0 2
10 2 4 6 12 379 0.02 0.02
11 0 1 1 2 367 0.00 0.00
12 0 0 1 1 365 0.00 0.00
Table A4
The last three columns are plotted as the dashed lines in panels six (there normalized
by dividing by 1355), seven and eight of Figure 8.
Here is how we calculated the hazards:
1. Column 6, “# left” is the empirical counterpart of (1 − F [t])(1 − Φ[t]),i . e . ,o f
S (t) in (33).
2. Column 7, “ˆ h”i st h er a t i o( ipo + acq)/(#left). That is, we treat IPOs and
acquisitions as equivalent success realizations. So, e.g., the value of this ratio
at age 1 is 39+19
1335 =0 .043, its value at age 2 is 54+49
1158 =0 .089, and so on. We now
show that this is the empirical counterpart of h(t). The sum of the columns (ipo
+ acq) we interpret as the number of successes at date t among ﬁrms for whom
T>t . The probability of τ = t and its surviving beyond t is f (t)(1− Φ[t]).
Therefore we equate these two concepts:
(ipo + acq) = f (t)(1− Φ[t]).
Therefore as calculated in Column 7, the “success hazard” is
ipo + acq
#l e f t
=
f (t)(1− Φ[t])
(1 − F [t])(1 − Φ[t])
=
f (t)
1 − F (t)
= h(t).
3. Column 8, “ˆ ψ”i st h er a t i o( term)/(#left). This is the empirical counter-
part of ψ(t); to see why, note that term is the number terminated at date
t among ﬁrms for whom T ≥ t and τ ≥ t. The probability of T = t and
τ ≥ t is Φ0 (t)(1− F [t]). Therefore we equate the two concepts: (term)
= Φ0 (t)(1− F [t]) whereupon, as calculated in Column 8, the “termination
hazard” is
term
#l e f t
=
Φ0 (t)(1− F [t])





439.2 Numerical algorithm to solve the model
To solve the model, we make use of the monotonic relationship between W and C.
As is apparent from equation (22), the value W of a generic project before the ﬁrst
investment increases monotonically in C.S ow h e nﬁxing all other model parameters
and W in equation (22), there is only one level of C that is congruent with these
parameter values.
W em a k eu s eo ft h i sf a c tb yd e c l a r i n gW a parameter of the model and then
backing out C as a result of it. This has two advantages: It is computationally
easier, and it allows us to keep W in the positive range, which is a requirement to
have a VC market at all. Note that, however, negative values for C may be obtained
in certain parameter regions, i.e. a payment to the VC in the beginning is needed to
reach a certain level W given the other parameters. However, negative levels of C
are penalized in the estimation, so that this is not a problem in the estimation.
Throughout, we use quadrature methods to solve the various integrals in the model
equations. The main advantage of these methods is that only a small number of func-
tion evaluations is needed to obtain a precise approximation. An obvious alternative
is Monte-Carlo integration, i.e. the simulation of a large number of projects. This
has the disadvantage that many more function evaluations are necessary to obtain a
good approximation. We use Monte-Carlo simulation in the end to check the results
we obtain by quadrature methods and ﬁnd that quadrature performs very well.
It actually turns out that the Monte-Carlo integrals have some variance even
when the number of simulated projects goes into the millions — this is because the
distribution for π is Pareto and does not have ﬁnite variance under the estimated
parameter λ =1 .9. Hence the speed of convergence of the Monte-Carlo integrals is
lower than for ﬁnite-variance problems (but the Law of Large Numbers for the mean
still holds, of course).
9.2.1 How to ﬁnd πmin(x)
There are two cases to consider when determining the lowest level of π tolerated by
aV Cw h e nl e a r n i n gπ at time x:








• x<τ m: I nt h i sc a s ew ec a n n o tu s et h eF O C .H o w e v e r ,w ek n o wt h a tt h e






















where ˜ T(π)=h−1[(1 − rW)/π] fulﬁlls the FOC for optimal stopping. Note
that this value is net of the opportunity cost W of scrapping the project at
once (i.e. at x). The integral in the formula above can be approximated by
Legendre Quadrature. As for all integrals calculated by quadrature methods in
this algorithm, we use 30 quadrature nodes. The root of the equation is found
by a Matlab-built-in numerical technique. We calculate πmin(x) for all values on
a grid between zero and τm; then we interpolate linearly between these points
to obtain values for πmin(x) between the grid points.
Ap l o to ft h eπmin(x) function under the estimated parameters can be found in
the left panel of Figure 9.
9.2.2 Vrev(x): the value of signal revelation at time x





where ˜ V (x,π) is given in equation (50). The function Vrev(x) value plays a crucial role
when ﬁnding T0, but also for the computation of C given W (or vice versa). Since the
upper bound of integration is inﬁnity and the integrand does not have closed form,
computation of this integral is not straightforward.
To approximate the solution, note that the value of a project ˜ V (x,π) becomes
linear in π in the limit; to determine a (large) ¯ π where the function is very close to
the asymptote, consider the following:
˜ V (x,π)=




















We want to ﬁnd ¯ π suﬃciently large so that the underbraced term equal to some very
small ε.W es o l v en u m e r i c a l l yf o rt h er e l e v a n t¯ π after taking logs (the terms e−rx and
45S(x) are not taken into account here since they also appear in the other two terms
in (??)—w ew a n tt om a k eε small relative to these terms):
ρln ¯ π + r˜ ρ¯ π = −lnε +l nμ − ρln˜ ρ + ρln(τm)
We choose ε =1 0 −5 in the implementation. The equation can be solved numerically
for ¯ π.
In the calculations for Vrev(x),w ee v a l u a t et h ei n t e g r a lf r o mπmin to ¯ π with Legen-
dre quadrature; for the region above we use the following approximation:









for π ≥ ¯ π. A is obtained with Legendre Quadrature for the part up to τm and by
Laguerre Quadrature for the part above.
Then we can get an approximation for the value from πsa b o v e¯ π in closed form,



































T h ep a r to ft h ei n t e g r a lb e l o w¯ π is again obtained by Legendre Quadrature; it
can be veriﬁed that the function V (π) is smooth (i.e. inﬁnitely often diﬀerentiable),
so quadrature yields very good results.
9.2.3 Find T0
Note that the FOC for T0 as given in equation (23) is decreasing in T0 for values
greater than τm: πmin(x) is increasing in x since the hazard is declining, and the
function below the integral is declining in T0.T h eﬁrst-order condition at t is:
FOC(t)=δVrev(t)+h(t)E[π] − (a + k) − rW
T h er o o to ft h i sf u n c t i o na b o v eτm is found numerically. Should the FOC be
already negative at τm–in this case, the VC would (in almost all cases) never want
to keep a project alive–we penalize heavily in the solution algorithm.
469.2.4 Find C given W
As described before, we have made C an outcome in terms of the parameter W,a n d
we have to solve the following equation to obtain C:





We use integration by parts here to account for the variable costs: First, pay the
lifetime value 1/r for all projects, then re-gain e−rt/r when the project comes to an
end — note that this yields the correct value (1 − ert)/r for each project. V (x) is
the time-0 value of all projects with revelation time x; this value does not change
anymore for x>T 0 since the policy is the same for all these projects; they yield E[π]
in all periods before T0, and then they are shut down.














−rt(π + W +1 /r)dF(t)+e
−rx[1 − F(x)](W +1 /r).
H(x,π) can be calculated in a similar way as described for ˜ V (x,π) before when ﬁxing
x and π.T h eﬁrst term of V (x) is easier to calculate since the policy does not vary
— either the project succeeds before x,o ri ti ss h u td o w na ts i g n a lr e v e l a t i o n :
Z πmin(x)
0

























We have to split up the second term in the formula for V (x) at ¯ π as described before























The ﬁrst integral is calculated by Legendre Quadrature; again, it can be checked that
















Now we can integrate over the smooth function V (x) from 0 to T0 in the above
formula for C. We do this by Legendre Quadrature.
9.2.5 Weights for the project pool








For details of the calculation strategy in this case, refer to the description of the
numerical implementation of the solution for R(t). In terms of terminations, we can








So the weight of screened projects in successes, i.e. the probability that a project had




A plot of this function under the estimated parameter values can be found on the
right panel of Figure 9.
9.2.6 Calculate α
Compute the expected present value CPV = CM
PV + CC
PV of all costs for the VC:
Clearly, the part coming from marginal cost must be CM
PV = k/r, since the VC will
never be idle and hence always pay a ﬂow cost k. The part CC
PV stemming from the
repeated payment of the ﬁxed cost C can be obtained in a recursive fashion:
C
C




where T =m i n {τ,T∗(π)} is the time of success or termination of the project,












E[e−rT] c a nb ec o m p u t e di nam a n n e rq u i t es i m i l a rt oC, so the computation proce-
dure is not explained again here. Now, we can obtain the α implied by the model:
α = W/CPV, as given in equation (55).
489.2.7 Calculate R(t)
We now calculate the implied returns as determined by (27). We ﬁrst need the density
of projects in the (x,π)-space at a given time t, i.e., the density on the pool of projects
that is still not terminated at time t. To obtain this density, ﬁrst deﬁne
ˆ q(x,π|t)=
(
b(x)g(x)I(π ≥ πmin(x,t)) if x ≤ t
b(x)g(x)I(t ≤ T0) if x>t
where πmin(x,t)=m a x {πmin(x),π min(t)} is the lowest project quality left from the
pool of projects screened at time x,a n dI(·) is the indicator function for an event.
















[1 − G(πmin(x,t))]dx + I(t ≤ T0)[1 − B(t)]
The left-hand side here is approximated by Legendre Quadrature over the smooth
parts of the integrand; notice that for t>τ m, πmin(x,t) will be ﬂat over some interval
on x and vary on the rest of the values for x (at least under reasonable parameters).
In this case, we employ quadrature on each of these parts in order to be operating
over a smooth integrand.








+I(t ≤ T0)[1 − B(t)]E[π]
| {z }
unscreened pool
Note that the integrand in the term on the left can be evaluated in closed form since
π is distributed Pareto. Again, we use Legendre Quadrature over the smooth parts
of the integrand to approximate the solution. A plot of the function E[π|t] under
the estimated parameters can be found in the left panel of Figure 9. Now we have







C +( 1− e−rt)k/r
¶
,
where s∗ is given in paragraph (9.2.10).
49Figure 9: Selection of π
9.2.8 Calculate k/C
The proportion of ﬁxed cost to ﬂow investment is k/C.
9.2.9 Calculate J(t)
We have





































Although we set s∗ =0 .4, A more recent sample that Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg
(2006) analyze shows that the founders now tend to retain a smaller share, 10% to
19%.
9.2.11 Calculate S(t),h(t) and ψ(t)
For the estimation, we now compute the C.D.F.s of terminations. Let ΦVC(t) be
the VC’s terminations C.D.F..By (4), π =( a + k + rW)/h
¡
TVC¢
, and so the frac-
tion of projects terminated by date t conditional on no success until date t,i . e . ,











































∞ for t =0






















where θ(π) ≡ g(π)/(1 − G(π)) is the hazard rate of G. The terminations and
hazards of rich Es with wealth w, written as ΦE,w (t) and ψ
E,w (t), also satisfy (51)
and (52), but with W set equal to zero, and with πVC
min replaced by πE
min. The same can
also be said for Es with wealth w<C+ k
r,e x c e p tt h a tπVC
min replaced by πE
min (w),a n d
that ψ
E,w (t) becomes inﬁnite at t = τ (w) deﬁned in (5). We compute the survival







where the terminations C.D.F. ΦVC(t) i sj u s tt h ec o n v e r s eo ft h ev a r i a b l eCt calcu-
lated before to obtain R(t) in paragraph 9.2.7. We calculate S(t) at the exact points
t =0 , t =1etc. since the survival is a stock variable which is measured exactly at
these points in the data, too.
The success hazard h(t),t=1 ,..,12 is computed according to the formula given
in section 9.5. Note that since success is purely exogenous, this hazard is solely
51governed by τm and ρ. We evaluate the hazard in the model in the middle of the
period corresponding to a year in the data, e.g. at t =0 .5 for the ﬁrst year, since the
data to calculate the empirical hazard stem from successes that are spread out over
the entire ﬁrst year; in other words, the hazard is a ﬂow concept.
Also the terminations hazard ψ(t) is calculated for t =1 ,..,12 s i n c ei ti saﬂow
variable in the data, too. In this case we compute the exact sample analog: For
the hazard over year 2, for example, we take the diﬀerence between the terminations
C.D.F. ΦVC(t) at t =1and t =2and then divide by the survival S(1).
9.3 Loss Function
The set of unknown parameters is {ρ,π0,λ,C,k}.T oe s t i m a t et h e m ,w eﬁx τm =4 .5
since this is the peak of the empirical hazard rate. Furthermore, we set r =0 .127 as
described before in paragraph 9.1.1.
We specify the loss function RSS for a set of parameters (ρ,π0,λ,k,W) and the
moments from the data as follows:
RSS = w1[ln ˆ α − lnα]
2 + w2
£









[ ˆ Jt − Jt]










[ˆ St − St]
2 (53)
We only penalize two out of the three functions h(t), S(t) and ψ(t) since knowledge
of two pins down the third. We chose penalties on logarithms for some moments since
a simple quadratic scheme did not penalize absurd behavior suﬃciently; for example,
when the ratio k/C goes from 1/10 to 1/100, this is a big qualitative change in our
eyes but would not be penalized much by a purely quadratic scheme.
For the weighting scheme, we chose w =( 5 ,1,1,0.1,0.1,0.5,0.01).T h e h i g h
penalty on α reﬂects both the importance we attach to this parameter and its low
scale. The other penalties are chosen to reﬂect the scale of the respective parameters.
We use a Matlab-built-in line-search method to minimize RSS with respect to the
parameters of the model. The minimization process proved to be very robust; the
algorithm converged to the same solution for almost any of about 100 randomly chosen
starting points. Using numerical gradients and standard errors of the moments, it
is possible to obtain (approximate) standard errors for our estimators. This is an
important next step in this project.
The described weighting scheme yielded the estimates reported in Table 2A. Es-
timates of R, S,a n dh are plotted in Figure 8.
529.4 Statistics from the solo entrepreneur’s problem
9.4.1 How to ﬁnd πmin(w,x)
For the solo entrepreneur with wealth w and an associated time τ(w) where she
runs out of wealth, we have the following value of a project with known π at x,f o r












The root of this equation is called πmin(w,x); this is the payoﬀ where the solo entre-
preneur of wealth π is just indiﬀerent between terminating and continuing a project.
The numeric solution to this problem is implemented just as the one in the analogous
equation for the VC described in paragraph 9.2.1.
We ﬁrst take a grid over the wealth levels of interest, [C,C +k/r]. Then, for each
wealth level w on the grid, we calculate πmin(w,x) for a grid point xi ∈ [0,τ(w)].B y
linearly interpolating between the grid points in the (w,x)-plane it is then possible
to obtain an approximate πmin(w,x) for any point (w,x).
A plot of the function E[π|t] for the unconstrained entrepreneur and for a con-
strained entrepreneur with w=9m$ can be found in the left panel of Figure 9.
9.4.2 The solo entrepreneur’s FOC for T0(w)
For entrepreneurs with τ(w) <τ m,w es e tT0 = τ(w), i.e. the entrepreneur does not
t e r m i n a t ep r o j e c t so fu n k n o w nv a l u eb e f o r es h er u n so u to fm o n e y .I nt h er e a s o n a b l e
parameter region, the ﬁrst-order condition for T0 is increasing below τm,s ot h a tt h e
entrepreneur would terminate everything at t =0—w ew a n tt oa v o i dt h i st os e e











For τ(w) >τ m, we check this condition at τm and τ(w): If it is not positive at τm,w e
set T0 = τm–the reasoning for this is the same as before for the case τ(w) <τ m .I f
it is still positive at τ(w), then the solo entrepreneur will let all unscreened projects
survive until the end, and we set T0 = τ(w). Otherwise, we solve the above equation
f o rar o o t—t h i sr o o tm u s tb eu n i q u es i n c et h eF O Ci sd o w n w a r d - s l o p i n gf o rt>τ m.
Again, we encounter the problem that the integral’s upper limit in the FOC is
inﬁnity, as was the case for the analogous problem of the VC in paragraph 9.2.3.
However, in the entrepreneurs case we have a natural upper bound for the linear
53asymptote: The function will already be linear for π such that ρπ ≥ τ(w). Hence we





























Again, we use Legendre Quadrature to approximate the integrals involved here, just
as in the VC’s case described in paragraph 9.2.3.
9.4.3 The VC’s and entrepreneur’s net worth and excess return
Derivation of (55).–To arrive at W and CPV we discount by r, t h er a t eo fr e t u r n
required given the risk characteristics of the income stream that the VC faces. That
rate depends partly on the covariance of the VC’s income stream with the market
index, i.e., β.Let rf denote the risk-free interest rate, and let rS&P denote the expected
return on the market index for which we shall use the S&P 500 as a proxy. Then the
CAPM prediction for the expected return on venture capital is
r = rf + β (rS&P − rf).
To verify (55) in another way, let time be discrete and assume that each company
matures and yields π for sure at the end of one period. Let p =1and k =0 .T h e n
one dollar today yields π dollars a period from now, and so the excess return on the
investment would be
α = π − (1 + r). (54)
Now let us instead calculate the excess return using (55): The VC then invests in a
new company every period, and his discount factor is 1
1+r.T h e r e f o r e
W =








Substituting these values into (55) gives us the same value of α as (54) does.
The lifetime value of venture capital is W, of which roughly a fraction 1 − R
e−rt|dS (t)| stems from the current project and the remainder from future project.




















This is also the VC’s ﬂow excess return per period, as explained further in the Ap-
pendix A. Let Cw




r be the PV of costs on an E





where ΦE,w is deﬁned in the remark following (52). The rate of return of E in excess
of r is
ε(w)=
QE (w) − C
Cw
PV
.( 5 6 )
At w∗ Ei si n d i ﬀerent between going solo and abandoning the project, hence ε(w∗)=
0.S i n c e∂QE (w)/∂w > 0, the numerator rises with w, but so does the denominator.
It rises with E’s level of wealth. The excess return becomes ﬂat at the point C +k/r,
i.e., the point where the solo E ceases to be liquidity constrained in any state of the
world, i.e., for any realization of π.
To calculate the present value of a project at t =0and the present value of the
cost, we ﬁrst deﬁne the optimal scrapping time as T∗(w,π)=m i n {ρπ,τ(w)}.T h e n
we have






































Unlike the other integrals, we compute the value of the project for the solo en-
trepreneur by Monte-Carlo methods. We simulate three million projects, apply the
optimal policies for a wealth level w which are given by the function πmin(w,x) and
the number T0(w), and then calculate the averages corresponding to the integral for
V (w). We do this for the entire grid of wealth levels deﬁned before.
The solo return for the entrepreneur is then simply
QS(w)=w + V (w)
where V (w) is given above. The excess return ε(w) is given by the ratio of expected
discounted revenue to expected discounted cost (both discounted at the same r used
in the VC model), which are again computed by Monte-Carlo integration.
55We use Monte-Carlo integration here instead of quadrature methods because they
are easier to implement; notice that we only calculate the statistics for the solo entre-
preneur after having found the optimal parameter vector, so computational parsimony
is not a concern here.
9.5 Derivation of h
We use n as the exponent in order to clarify the algebra, and then we shall evaluate
the result at n =2 . We write the mixing parameter as μ.T h e n







Then For t<τ m,f(t)= 1





,a n dt h e r e f o r e
f (t)






































For t ≥ τm
f (t)











































n =2 , this leads to μ = 2
2+ρ, 1 − μ =
ρ


























569.6 Procedure behind Figure 7
This how the empirical distribution of company’s age at IPO was obtained excluding
rollups and spinoﬀs:
• First, we matched the data on all ﬁrms on Ritter’s website (N =8 ,309)w i t h
t h el i s th es e n tt ou s ,w h i c ha r et h eo n e st h a ta r eb a c k e db yV C s( N =2 ,899).
• We only consider the year of the oﬀering date, getting rid of the month and the
day. The diﬀerence between this year and the founding year is the age at IPO.
IssueAge.
• All records for which one of the two years is missing (27 companies) and for
which the age at IPO turns out to be negative (3 companies, these are presum-
ably errors in the data) are excluded.
• This leaves 5,522 companies that were solo at IPO and 2,784 companies that
were VC-backed.
• Now, these data are matched to the data from Ritter about spinoﬀs. Companies
that are spinoﬀs are excluded, which eliminates 810 records.
• Also, the company data are manually matched to the data from Brown, Dittmar
and Servaes (2005) on rollups: This creates ﬁve matches, but none of these
matches results in new exclusions since the records had been excluded in one
of the earlier stages.
• In the end, we have NS =4 ,850 solo companies and NVC =2 ,675 VC-backed
companies left in the sample.
The two graphs show the following:
1. Empirical pdf: This is the proportion of companies that had IPO exactly at
age t.
2. Empirical cdf: This is the proportion of IPOs up to (and including) age t.
T h ed o t t e dl i n e sa r ec o n ﬁdence bands at 95%-conﬁdence level (two-sided); they
come from the Matlab-built-in Kaplan-Meier method.
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